International conflict resolution : a change of perception by Fitzgerald, Ellen Frances.
e 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
F553 
1997 
ELLEN FITZGERALD 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION -
A CHANGE OF PERCEPTION 
LLB (HON) RESEARCH PAPER 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (LAWS 532) 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
1997 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY OF 
WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wananga 
o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
LIBRARY 
I 
I I 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
III 
A 
B 
IV 
A 
B 
C 
D 
V 
VI 
A 
B 
C 
D 
VII 
A 
B 
VIII 
IX 
contents 
abstract 
INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT 
Nature of Conflict 
Conflict Resolution 
Changing Face Of Global Conflict 
Causes of Conflict 
Conflict Progression- A Framework for Peace 
1. Education 
2. Advocacy 
3. Negotiation and mediation 
4. Resolution/sustainable peace 
APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Mediation 
Conflict "Facilitation" and Problem Solving 
page number 
CASE STUDY - THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
Pre 1993 Conflict Resolution 
1. The Madrid peace process - active mediation 
2. The Norway Channel 
3. Unofficial Third Party Intervention 
The Norway Channel And Facilitated Problem Solving 
Post 1993 Events Under The Peace Accord - Progress 
Towards Peace? 
Hirschfeld On The Peace Process 
DEFINITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A Hybrid Approach to Conflict Resolution 
Deutsch's Constructive Conflict Management 
A Public Peace Process - Chufrin & Saunders 
Ury's Informal Model of International Conflict 
Resolution 
IMPEDIMENTS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 
The International Legal System 
The Need for a Paradigm Shift 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
2 
3 
3 
3 
6 
8 
9 
1 2 
1 4 
1 5 
1 5 
1 5 
1 6 
1 6 
1 7 
20 
20 
20 
22 
25 
25 
27 
32 
36 
39 
40 
42 
44 
46 
47 
47 
49 
50 
54 
abstract 
A change of approach to international conflict resolution 1s 
clearly needed in the light of the changing face of global 
conflict from traditional state-to-state conflicts to human 
oriented conflicts within states concerned with issues of 
identity, human rights and the recognition of culture and 
religion. An holistic view of conflict suggests that these types 
of deep-rooted conflicts can only be resolved when the human 
dimensions of the conflict are addressed and there is 
acceptance and understanding of each other's needs. The task 
is one of changing conflictual relationships by improving 
methods of communication; changing attitudes; and 
implementing consultation between parties in order to foster 
constructive methods of conflict resolution. 
There is a need to move away from "crisis" conflict mediation 
to preventive intervention. A culture shift must occur where a 
co-operative orientation must occur on a global level, and the 
most effective way for this to occur is from the "grass roots" 
level up to the official level, with all processes working 
together. This reorientation involves shifting the focus of 
conflict away from individual issues towards the fundamentals 
of the relationship between the parties in conflict. 
A framework for a multi-disciplinary approach to conflict 
resolution is needed to co-ordinate international peace efforts 
together so as to increase their effectiveness. This framework 
should consist of a combination of complementary approaches 
to international conflict resolution including the method of 
informal conflict facilitation by unofficial third parties which 
has proven lo result in successful intervention . 
2 
I INTRODUCTION 
The nature of conflict in the international arena 1s shifting 
from traditional state to state conflicts to conflicts within 
states. This paper examines conceptual work done 10 the field 
of international conflict resolution which attempts to explain 
this change and to invent processes to effectively manage 
current global conflict. This paper reviews theories of conflict 
processes and the causes of conflict, and examines how this 
work shapes current approaches to international conflict 
resolution. This paper also examines whether an holistic 
approach to conflict results in a more realistic and effective 
approach to conflict resolution. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace agreement 1s 
assessed as a current case study of conflict and resolution to 
determine factors which assist or detract from conflict 
resolution. The case study is also used to derive principles for 
effective conflict management. This paper then considers the 
the definition of a successful intervention before addressing 
the need for a framework within which to increase the 
effectiveness of international conflict resolution. The paper 
also discusses the practical implications of changing 
perceptions to conflict and its resolution in the international 
sphere. 
I I AN OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT 
A Th e Nature of Conflict 
At first impression, the term "conflict" evokes negative images 
of hostility , fighting or struggle. These images of conflict are 
valid, but they really describe a common result of the 
"clashing of opposed principles",! which is a definition of 
conflict that does not automatically imply a result of hostility 
or violence. 
1 Th e Con cise Oxford Dictionary (8 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991) 
240. 
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The work of John Paul Lederach sheds insight on the nature 
and effects of conflict.2 Social conflict is a phenomenon of 
human creation, lodged naturally in relationships. It is a 
phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in 
which the conflict occurs, and the creators of the conflict. 
Under this view, conflict is a necessary element in 
transformative human construction and reconstruction of 
social organisations and realities. 
Lederach holds that conflicts anse from and are based on a 
bank of social knowledge that societies have developed. Key 
factors in this process are: 
1. that social conflict is a natural, common expenence 
present in all relationships and cultures. 
2. that conflicts do not "just happen" to people - people are 
active participants in creating the situations and 
interactions they experience as conflict. 
3. that people act on the basis of the meanings they attach 
to events and issues, and the correspondingly 
appropriate responses and actions to be taken . 
4. that conflict emerges through an interactive process 
based on humankind's search for meaning, and meaning 
is gained from shared and accumulated knowledge. 
All knowledge or communication goes through phases (1) the 
idea to be communicated (2) the expression to another (3) the 
perception of that other of what was said (4) the interpretation 
of what was said (based on that other's bank of knowledge). 
It is evident through this process of communication how easily 
conflict and misunderstanding can arise. Thi s scheme 
effectively illustrates how different meanings can be attached 
to the same thing. From this viewpoint it is easy to see how 
conflict and its resolution can often end up becoming a war of 
words - because words give meaning to what people feel and 
are prcscri pti ve of other's interpretations of what people mean 
2 John Paul Lederach Preparing for Peace: Confli ct Tran .1formation 
Across Cultures (Syrac use University Press, New York , 1995) . 
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as well. This view holds that the construction of social 
meanrng lies at the heart of the creation of human conflict. 
This view 1s in accord with the view of R. J. Rummel who 
describes conflict as "the clash of power in the striving of all 
things to be manifest" and the "process of powers meeting and 
balancing". 3 Rummel's theory is that conflict exists as a 
continuing spiral or helix of social change, revolving around 
latent conflict and actual conflict with three levels: (1) 
potentialities for conflict; (2) dispositions towards conflict; and 
(3) manifestations of conflict. 
Rummel provides a framework for conflict to be viewed within 
which divides the life-cycle of a conflict into five phas·es: (1) 
the latent conflict; (2) the initiation of conflict; (3) the 
balancing of power (where negotiation and mediation fits in); 
( 4) the balance of power (where a resolution is reached); (5) 
the disruption of equilibrium (where human needs and the 
construction of social meaning require change again). Rummel 
points out that the wish to eliminate all conflict is probably 
undesirable as it would result in freezing reality and 
preventing any change. 
Folberg & Taylor describe conflict as a set of divergent aims 
and point out that it is not necessarily bad or wrong but is 
simply viewed negatively because it is equated with win/lose 
situations. However, they point out that conflict can function 
in positive ways; by reducing incipient tension through making 
issues manifest; by clarifying objectives; and as Jandt put it "It 
has been demonstrated that through conflict man is creative".4 
3 R. J. Rumme l Undersranding Con/lief and War Vols. l & 2 (Wiley 
Publishe rs, ew York, 1976) as discussed in J. Folberg & A. Taylor 
"Nature of Conflict and Di sp ute Resolution Processes" in M edia tion: A 
Comprehensive Guide ro Reso lvin g Confliers wirhour Lirigarion (Jossey-
Bass, USA, 1984) p. 21. 
4 Folberg & Taylor " Nature of Conflict and Dispute Resolution 
Processes", above n 3, p. 19, also included reference to F. Jandt (ed.) 
Con.flier Resolu rion Through Communiearion (Harper & Row, New York, 
1973) . 
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Paul Salem emphasises the capacity that conflict has for 
creating change, which is necessary for progression, and 
criticises the Western view that conflict is an evil to be 
prevented.5 
The combination of all these conflict theories points to a 
conclusion that conflict is a natural phenomenon. Conflict 1s 
not to be prevented at all costs but requires management to 
create positive change rather than resulting in violence and 
stalemate. 
B Conflict Resolution 
Conflict is a dynamic process, not a contest between srntic 
interests, and moving conflict towards resolution is a broad 
continuing process rather than a one-off event such as a 
negotiated agreement. 6 The clear recognition of this view of 
conflict as a reality results in an approach to conflict that 
focuses on relationships between the parties rather than 
specific issues in order to resolve conflicts. 
Recently, theorists have recognised the need for more complex 
conflict resolution strategies to address the human as well as 
the state dimensions of conflict. It is important to deal not 
only with the concrete issues of military deployment or 
diplomatic recognition, but the larger task of changing 
conflictual relationships between groups of people. 
Increasing inter-ethnic and intra-state conflict allows an 
interpretation that the bases for these conflicts are human 
oriented, concerned with identity, human rights and the 
recognition of culture and religion. This reflects a shifting 
agenda in global politics. These types of conflict should not be 
overruled by force, or by employing a "right/wrong" 
5 Paul E. Salem "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-
Western Perspective" ( 1993) 11 Negotiation Journal 361. 
6 Harold H. Saunders "Possibilities and Challenges: Another Way to 
Consider Unofficial Third-Party Intervention" ( 1995) 11 Negotiation 
Journal 271, 272. 
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perspective on the behaviour of the parties involved, but 
should be resolved in light of the current global environment 
supporting human rights. These conflicts can only be resolved 
when there is acceptance and understanding of each other's 
needs, and relationships are transformed into communicative 
and co-operative interdependence rather than destructive 
antagonism. 
Most conflict theorists uphold that conflict can result in either 
constructive or destructive processes .7 Morton Deutsch 
proposes that there are co-operative and competitive types of 
social relationships which tend to elicit similar characteristics. 
These social relationships result respectively rn constructive or 
destructive processes of conflict resolution. 8 
Deutsch holds that co-operation induces and 1s induced by a 
perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes; a readiness to be 
helpfu 1; openness in communication; trusting and friendly 
attitudes; sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of 
opposed interests; an orientation towards enhancing mutual 
power rather than power differences, and so on. A co-
operative orientation usually results in a constructive 
resolution process which attempts to perpetuate co-operation 
amongst the parties. 
Similarly, competition induces and is induced by the use of 
tactics of coercion, threats, or deception; attempts to enhance 
the power differences between parties; poor communication; 
minimisation of the awareness of similarities in values and 
increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and 
hostile attitudes; and so on. A competitive orientation usually 
leads to a destructive conflict process where there is a lack of 
communication between the parties in conflict which results in 
mistrust. This attitude in turn reinforces pre-existing 
expectations under a competitive orientation and the ability of 
7 Morton Deutsch, Dudley Weeks, Lederach. 
8 Morton Deutsch "Constructive Conflict Management for the World 
Today" ( 1994) 5:2 International Journal of Conflict Management 111, 
112. 
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one party to notice and respond to shifts away from a win/lose 
orientation by the other party becomes impaired. A 
competitive orientation to conflict maintains the view that the 
solution lies in superior force, deception or cleverness, and 
results in attempts by each party to create or enhance power 
differences favourable to its own side. This view tends to 
expand the scope of conflict from the issues in conflict to the 
entire relationship between the parties. 
Most nations attempt to resolve conflict rn unsustainable ways, 
focusing on the issues over which parties clash rather than the 
attitudes of the parties to each other and the relationship 
within which the conflict has arisen. The competitive 
"win/lose" orientation has usually expanded the conflict from 
opposition over issues to general opposition, and in order to 
resolve a conflict the parties must be re-oriented towards each 
other; made to recognise their similarities; and re-open the 
lines of communication in order to achieve a co-operative 
orientation towards each other. A co-operative orientation will 
result in a continuing process of dialogue and negotiation 
where co-operation and joint problem solving will result. 
C The Changing Face of Global Conflict 
A state-centred conception of international relations and 
conflict - which involves states amassing economic and 
military power to pursue objectively defined interests in zero-
sum (where one party must lose when another gains) contests 
of material power with other states - has dominated the last 
three centuries. The traditional methods of dispute resolution 
under this model include diplomacy, force, and mediation and 
negotiation on an official level. 
The nature of global conflict is shifting from traditional 
international (state to state) conflict to mainly intra-national 
(within a state) conflicts. Since l 989, only two out of 94 
conflicts were of the traditional kind between states, the rest 
8 
have all occurred within a state.9 Conflicts within states are 
generally inter-ethnic and involve disputes about sovereignty 
or autonomy, identity, recognition and religion. 
This increase of intra-national conflict has demonstrated that 
some conflicts are triggered by citizens outside government 
and often seem to be beyond the influence of institutions and 
instruments of the state. It is important in the current global 
climate to recognise that these kinds of conflicts are rooted not 
in objective state interests (such as territory, power and 
wealth) but in human needs (such as identity, security, 
recognition and participation which are needs relating to 
growth and development). 
The recognition and acceptance of the right to self-
determination as a fundamental principle in international 
affairs has created a situation which demands a difficult and 
exacting experiment of global co-operation. 
The current trend of globalisation has involved a vast amount 
of international interaction, yet there has been a rise of 
ethnocentrism and religious fundamentalism as people seek a 
social identity, for reasons such as security, cognitive clarity, 
and self-esteem. Humans need to understand and categorise 
but this can lead to intolerance, exclusion and violence towards 
others. In contrast to this ethnocentrism, industry is drawing 
the world into a tighter web of interdependence in the sphere 
of economics which has a competitive zero-sum (win/lose) 
orientation and which may lead to destructive conflict 
resolution processes. 
D Causes of Conflict 
Paul Emond considers that conflict arises from four principal 
factors, namely: that individual need is insatiable and 
resources are limited; that conflict springs from the clash of 
different values; that different understanding of a situation 
9 Jacob Bercovitch "Understanding Mediation's Role in Preventive 
Diplomacy" ( 1996) 12 Negotiation Journal 241, 242. 
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leads to cognitive conflict; that diverse ideas compete for 
recognition and legitimacy .1 O These are some of the causes for 
conflict, but Emond places them in a less positive and 
somewhat irremediable context by determining that need 1s 
insatiable, where it is my opinion that greed is insatiable and 
need is more manageable. 
An insightful theory which can be used as a basis for 
understanding conflict, and approaching conflict resolution, 
comes from the work of John Burton. 11 The crux of the human 
needs theory is that over time all societies experience conflicts 
between the institutional values and structures of society on 
the one hand and human needs at the level of the individual 
on the other hand. Human needs reflect universal motivations, 
and include biological needs such as food and shelter, as well 
as needs relating to growth and development. A human needs 
perspective when applied to international conflict resolution 
focuses attention on needs for identity, security, recognition , 
participation, dignity and justice. I 2 
The role of human needs in the emergence of international 
conflicts and social change can be seen by focusing on the 
impact that human needs deprivation has on the long-term 
legitimacy and stability of political and socia l systems. Human 
needs theori sts argue that social systems that fail to satisfy 
human needs will inevitably grow unstable and be forced to 
undergo some sort of change (. through violence or conflict). 
This does not mean that human needs will be fulfilled but that 
individuals will strive to fulfil them.1 3 This approach also 
I O D. Paul Emond "A lternative Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual 
Overview" in Commercial Dispute Resolution (Ca nad a Law Book Co., 
Canada, 1989) as discus sed in Folberg & Taylor, above n 3. 
I I John Burton Conflict: Resolution and Proven1io11 (S t. Martin's Press, 
New York, 1990), Conflict: H11111a11 Needs Theory (St. Martin's Press, New 
York , 1990). 
I 2 These are listed in Ke lman 's article "Applying Human Needs 
Perspective to the Practice of Conflict Resolution " in Burton's Conflic1: 
Human Needs Th eory ( 1990) at p. 284. The list is merely to give an idea 
of what the human needs theory identifies in inte rnational conflict, 
and is not meant to be prescriptive or exhaustive. 
13 J. A. Rosati , D. Carroll and R . A. Coate "A Critical Assessment of the 
Power of Human Needs in World Society" in John Burton and Frank 
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recognises that human needs are constantly changing and 
evolving. 
In an attempt to keep control of society with the increase of 
disputes, conflicts, crime, violence and ethnic wars, 
governments are led into practices which, performed by 
others, would be described as terrorism and murder. Burton 
points out that there is something self-defeating in traditional 
norms if they require for their defence just those behaviours 
they seek to control (that is violence and threats of violence) 
and that there is clearly a need for a paradigm shift from 
power-elite norms to human needs norms. 1 4 
A large body of theory has simply assumed that human nature 
is evil and aggressive, and the range of human needs is thus 
limited to the pursuit of power, security, and prestige . This 
theory has been applied to the international arena, assuming 
that these same characteristics account for state behaviour. 
However, focusing attention on the complex composition of 
human needs motivation, which leads individuals to join 
various groups in pursuit of needs and values satisfaction, 
should be recognised as a realistic and responsible approach to 
analyses of social and international relations, particularly rn 
the current international political environment. I 5 
The human needs model put forward by Burton and others 
indicates that some causes of conflict are rooted rn 
fundamental values. When needs are not clarified , ignored or 
not met or where any group is denied rights and denied a 
method of redressing that denial by peaceful means, then that 
group's only recourse is to violence, in order to make their 
plight a priority to be remedied by the group 111 power. 
Clearly human needs is only one way of focusing on a conflict. 
It is also important to look at the understanding of the parties 
Dukes (eds.) Conflict: Readin gs in Mana gemen t and Resolu tion (St. 
Martin 's Press, New York, 1990) p. 157 . 
14 Above n 11. 
l 5 Above n I I . 
I I 
and the communication within their relationship. This is 
where both Deutsch and Lederach hold that co-operation and 
communication within relationships can lead to constructive 
conflict resolution, and so the focus of this type of resolution IS 
on the actual relationship between the parties and how this 
can be improved. 
A hybrid of intervention techniques appears to be useful at 
this stage as the task of changing conflictual relationships is a 
wide and difficult one, and an holistic approach to it would 
mean that all facets of conflict resolution become important. 
The premise is that a conflict should never be unsolvable -
even if the only workable solution is a compromise - as long as 
the parties are satisfied and recognise that the compromise is 
better than the previous situation for either party. 
Unfortunately or fortunately, standards have been set by the 
global community which denigrate and uphold different types 
of moral behaviour. There is no great higher power in the 
global community that can control the behaviour of parties -
with force of will or arms or by intimidation - that has 
authority by any mandate. The United Nations exists with 
moral strength but has not the capacity to enforce its will, 
resulting in a situation where compromise and settlement IS 
often a necessity in the face of military strength and 
dominance of one party to a conflict. 
E Conflict Progression - A Framework for Peace 
Adam Curle was a Quaker conciliator who wrote Making Peace 
in l 971. He envisaged a model of conflict progression which 
Lederach bui Ids upon in his "Framework for Peace". I 6 
Lederach' framework for peace maintains that the 
development or a long-term view of conflict is necessary 111 
constructing a broader understanding and approach to building 
peace. Lederach holds that such a framework must be 
inclusive - embracing multiple facets such as the 
interdependence of roles and activities ( of peacemakers, 
16 Curie's model taken from his book Making 
111 Lederach, above n 2. 
Peace ( 1971) is depicted 
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diplomats, educators and others) and a clear v1s10n of the 
broader agenda which the efforts of peacemaking and conflict 
resolution undertake. 
Curle' s conflict progression model suggests that the movement 
from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships can be charted in a 
graph comparing levels of awareness of conflicting interests 
and needs . (See Figure 1) The key steps identified by Curle rn 
this diagram are 1. education 2. confrontation 3. negotiation 4. 
sustainable peace. 
Figure 1 1 7 
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Figure 1 
The Progression of Conflict 
Our thinking about conflict may have changed slightly since 
Curle developed this model, and now the "sustainable peace" 
at the end of the progression can be considered not as an "end" 
of the conflict but a resolution of the issues where the parties' 
interests clashed. Now it would be said that conflict is a 
natural part of relationship which is constantly evolving and 
should not be prevented but merely channelled in a positive 
direction. Appropriately Curle' s linear model could be adapted 
into a circular or elliptical model which return s back to the 
beginning point of the graph - where latent conflict exists. (See 
I 7 Above n 16. 
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Figure 2) This simplified adaptation of Curle' s model 
incorporates the idea of conflict being a continuous natural 
cyclical phenomena with the notion that it also progresses as 10 
Curle' s diagram. 
Figure 2 
2. Confrontation/ Advocacy 
(Overt Conflict) 
3 . Negotiation 
and Mediation) 
f 4. Resolution/ 
Sustainable Peace 
1. Education 
(Latent Conflict) 
Curie's diagram is a useful tool in plotting the stages in a given 
conflict and for suggesting potential activities that might be 
undertaken at a given time. Lederach' s framework for peace 
interprets and builds on Curie's model identifying the stages 
which typically occur in a conflict by pointing out three key 
peacemaking functions - education, advocacy and mediation -
which can be applied through this progression to assist in 
resolution. The interrelation of Lederach's framework for 
peace and Curie's conflict progression model is outlined 
below:18 
I. Education 
Education or conscientisation 1s needed when the conflict 
is hidden and people arc unaware or imbalances or 
injustices. The function of education is aimed at erasrng 
ignorance and raising awareness of injustice and the 
nature or unequal relation hips and the need for 
I 8 Above n 2. 
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addressing and restoring equity, as seen, of course, from 
the view of those expenencrng the injustices. 
Increased awareness rarely leads to immediate change 
and often demands for change are not even heard or 
taken seriously by those who are benefiting from the 
status quo. 
2. Advocacy 
This is where Lederach suggests the entry of advocates 
who work with and support those pursuing change and 
pushing for a balancing of power. This involves a 
recognition of mutual dependence increasing the voice of 
the less powerful and a legitimisation of their concerns. 
This usually occurs through some form of confrontation 
involving choices between violent or non violent 
behaviour to get attention. If successful, the 
confrontation will increase the awareness of 
interdependence and balance power. 
3. Negotiation and mediation 
It is here that negotiation becomes possible and the role 
of mediation emerges. Essentially negotiation means that 
the groups involved recognise that they cannot simply 
impose their will or eliminate the other side, but rather 
must work together the achieve their goals. 
4. Resolution/sustainable peace 
Successful negotiation and mediation lead to a 
restructuring of the relationship towards increased 
justice and equality. Mediation can and should facilitate 
the articulation of legitimate needs and interests of all 
concerned, which should lead to fair, practical, and 
mutually acceptable solutions. 
This framework for peace (progression of conflict) lays out a 
paradigm which contemplates the direction of mediation and 
envisages a multiplicity of approaches to achieve it. 
I 5 
I I I APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
For the purposes of this paper this discussion of approaches to 
international conflict resolution will be limited to the area of 
mediation, which is the most common form of international 
conflict resolution, and which attempts to bring the parties 
together to negotiate. In particular, the focus will be on 
unofficial third party intervention which attempts to answer 
the need for a change in approach to conflict resolution to 
include the deep-rooted human dimensions of conflict. 
A Mediation 
Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston define international 
mediation as "a reactive process of conflict management 
whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of 
help from, an indi victual, group, or organisation to change their 
behaviour, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem 
without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of 
the law." 19 
The scope of mediation activities rn the international arena is 
truly immense - third party intervention can occur on both 
official and unofficial levels, and mediator behaviour can be 
classified along a continuum ranging from low to high level 
intervention.20 
At the low end are communication-facilitation strategies where 
a mediator takes a fairly passive role, largely as a channel of 
communication between the parties, and exhibits little control 
over the process or substance. The most active mediation 
strategies involve directive mediator behaviour where the 
mediator sets out to affect the content and substance of the 
19 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston "The Study of International 
Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence" in Jacob 
Bercovitch (ed.) Resolving International Conflic1s: The Theory and 
Prac1ice of Mediation (Lynne Rienner Publishers Ltd., Colorado, 1996) 
p. 13. 
20 Bercovitch and Houston, above n 19, p. 29-30. 
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mediation as well as the process. A mediator might achieve 
this by providing incentives, offering rewards and 
punishments, issuing ultimatums, and introducing proposals . 
Adam Curle says mediation is "a psychological effort to change 
perceptions both of the conflict and of the "enemy" to the 
extent that both protagonists gain some hope of a reasonable 
resolution and so are more prepared to negotiate seriously."2 I 
Although simplistic, this description of mediation gives a very 
clear view of the actual goal of mediation, because in the final 
analysis, no resolution can be achieved without the direct 
input of the parties concerned. Mediation is more than 
resolution however; it involves the re-orientation of parties 
towards each other and the issues in conflict. 
Mediation at an international level can involve official 
representatives of the parties to the conflict, or it can be 
unofficial intervention including citizen diplomacy, pre-
negotiation, problem-solving workshops, and back-channel 
second tier ("track two") diplomacy. 
A lot of unofficial third party intervention occurs at the same 
time as official mediation or negotiation, working on changing 
attitudes and political atmosphere. This type of intervention 
seems to address the complex layers of conflict, aiming at the 
motivation behind conflicts and the relationships between 
states rather than treating conflicts as relating to static 
interests or one-off events. 
B Conflict "Facilitation" and Problem Solving 
The ideas discussed above about the nature of conflict lead 
current theorists and practitioners towards a holistic approach 
to conflict resolution. The reality is that conflicts cannot be 
suppressed, they are necessary to produce change and react to 
the changing environment of human needs. Conflicts can be 
turned towards constructive or destructive paths, and 
2 I Adam Curle Tools for Transformation: A Persona l View (Hawthorn 
Press, UK, 1990) p. 25. 
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practitioners need to focus on the relationships between the 
parties; identifying the human needs that are sought to be 
fulfilled; and bringing the parties together in facilitated joint 
problem solving endeavours in order to direct conflicts away 
from destruction. 
Saunders points out that "deep-rooted human conflicts are not 
ready for formal mediation and negotiation because people do 
not negotiate about their identities, fears, and historic 
grievances. "2 2 
Human needs theory leads directly to a role for problem 
solving as an approach to conflict resolution. Human needs 
explains the existence of the conflict and problem solving 
proposes to delve into the causal circumstances of the conflict, 
thus creating a resolution that satisfies human needs rather 
than punishing groups for the results of an unjust society. A 
human needs framework for conflict resolution shifts 
definitions of justice to a basic principle that inherent human 
needs must be satisfied if law and order is to be sustained and 
societies are to be stable and non-violent. 
Problem solving as envisaged by Burton and Groom has the 
third party playing a facilitative role, to assist in dialogue 
between the parties only. The primary activity engaged rn by 
the parties is analysis of the problems, the goal of which is to 
reveal positions, frustrations, constraints and perceptions. This 
occurs through face-to-face interaction between non-official 
representatives of two parties (at any one time) to a conflict.2 3 
An example of this type of approach can be seen in Herbert 
Kelman' s interactive problem-solving model, which was 
22 Above n 6 , 272. 
23 A. J. R. Groom "Facilitating Problem Solving in Internationalised 
Conflicts" in Edward A. Azar and J. W. Burton (eds.) International 
Conflict Resolution (Wheatsheaf, USA, 1986) and Burton Conflicr: 
Resolution and Provent ion ( 1990), Co,~flict: Human Needs Theory ( 1990). 
derived from the work of Burton, and was used during the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 24 
The workshops run by Kelman and others used an academic 
setting with its expectation of a free exchange of views and the 
consideration of creative solutions in a non-committal 
environment to bring influential Israelis and Palestinians 
together. In this approach the third party usually consists of a 
panel of social scientists with expertise in group process and 
international conflict, and at least some familiarity with the 
conflict region . The task of the third party is to facilitate 
rather than mediate, they provide the setting, create the 
atmosphere conducive to discussion, establish the norms and 
offer occasional interventions. 
This process encourages solutions to emerge out of the 
interaction between the parties themselves, and uses academic 
norms because they favour open discussion, attentive listening 
to opposing views, and an analytical approach, in contrast to 
the polemical , accusatory, and legalistic approach that conflict 
and political norms tend to promote. 
The approach described here is an application of a human 
needs perspective to the practice of international conflict 
resolution. The whole enterprise is designed as an effort to 
find, through joint creative problem-solving, solutions to the 
conflict that would satisfy the needs of both parties. The 
workshops are structured so that the focus of the conflict 
analysis 1s on the parties whose needs are at the core of the 
conflict. 
This process of conflict "facilitation" takes a far more extensive 
view of conflict emphasising the need for recognition that 
conflict resolution involves more than merely trying to 
"resolve" some opponent conflict. The process is geared at 
24 He rbe rt C. Kelman " Int eract ive problem-solving" discus sed in 
Burton (ed.) Con/lic1 · Human Needs Theory ( 1990) p . 285, and Kelman 
"Co ntributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-
Palestinian Breakthrough" ( 1995) 11 Negotiation Journal 19. 
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enabling the parties to identify and understand each other's 
needs and take them into account simultaneously in working 
on overall solutions. 
The aim was that these types of workshops would be a second 
or third tier of peacemaking efforts which could assist with the 
first tier negotiations the ideas which surfaced in the 
workshops could be put onto the international stage to be 
tossed around by the actual decision makers. 
IV CASE STUDY - THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT 
This case study intends to analyse the different conflict 
resolution processes, particularly the successful secret Norway 
Channel, that were involved in establishing an interim self-
government agreement between Israel and the PLO in 
September 1993. The main focus is on the dispute resolution 
processes occurring around the time of the agreement to 
determine how effective the processes were, and some 
possible reasons for any differences in effectiveness. The case 
study then follows the progress of the peace process after 
1993 and reflects on the implementation of the agreement and 
the ongoing process of negotiations. 
A Pre J 993 Conflict Resolution 
At the heart of the hostility between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours was the question of a Palestinian homeland, which 
hung on the fate of the territories occupied by Israel ince the 
Six Day War in 1967. The Occupied Territories had remained 
in Israel's hands for nearly a quarter of a century, despite 
United Nations resolutions calling for withdrawal, violent 
Palestinian insurrection, and in defiance of international 
opposition. 
J. The Madrid peace process - active mediation 
The aim of the Madrid peace process, which began 111 1991 111 
Madrid and quickly shifted to Washington, was to work 
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towards an agreement on the shape and functions of interim 
self-government for the Palestinians, and ultimately on the 
permanent status of the Occupied Territories in the old area of 
Palestine. 
The process was launched after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf 
War; George Bush had proclaimed that the region's problems 
would be resolved by America and its new partner Russia. 
Bush's concept of a "new world order" meant that great things 
were expected of the Middle East, and Israel in particular was 
expected to play its part. The hope was that the Palestinian 
problem could be solved, and that Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 
would then be able to resolve their differences with Israel, 
creating a situation of sustainable peace in the Middle East. 
To reach an interim agreement two complex sets of talks were 
convened simultaneously. The main ones were centred at the 
State Department in Washington and were bi-lateral talks 
between three Israeli teams and three Arab delegations - one 
from Syria, one from Lebanon and a joint Jordan/Palestinian 
delegation. Under the new Clinton Administration however, 
the USA determined that it would become "full partners" to the 
negotiations and be fully involved in trying to get the dispute 
resolved. The subsidiary, multilateral talks took place at 
various locations around the world and involved thirty 
countries acting as sponsors and advisers. The multilateral 
talks concentrated on more practical problems in the region 
such as water-sharing, arms control, the economy, the 
environment and the fate of refugees. 
The peace talks in Washington were in difficulty. The Israeli 
government refused to negotiate directly with the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) government-in-exile headed by 
Yasser Arafat whom they considered to be untrustworthy 
renegade terrorists. Also the talks had degenerated into public 
posturing for the press, and no progress of any substance had 
come about after two years of negotiations. 
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2. The Norway Channel 
The Norway Channel was envisaged by the Norwegians as a 
"back channel" to the public Washington negotiations. An 
influential Norwegian researcher and social scientist, Terje 
Larsen, was working on a survey of living conditions in the 
Occupied Territories and became involved in the peace process 
when he suggested to a top Israeli politician that Norway could 
use its "good offices" to establish secret contacts with the 
Palestinians to assist the peace talks. Larsen ' s academic 
institute was independent yet it had close links with the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, and Larsen felt it would be useful 
for Israel and the PLO to exchange and develop ideas and 
establish behind-the-scenes relations. 
The intention was for the meetings to be an academic exercise, 
and a recent paper written by a leading PLO official, Abu Ala, 
advocating economic co-operation on a regional basis in the 
Middle East had provided a basis from which the two groups 
could work together. An Israeli academic, Yair Hirschfeld, 
headed a research unit called the Economic Co-operation 
Foundation, which was dedicated to advance the cause of peace 
through establishing direct links with the Palestinians and was 
patronised by the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister. 
The two men were brought together by Larsen while the 
multilateral talks on economic issues were convened in Britain, 
and both felt that continuing talks under secrecy in Oslo might 
be useful. 
The approach of the Norwegians to this exercise was crucial in 
determining why it succeeded in reaching agreement where 
the peace talks in Washington had failed. It was evident that 
the Washington talks were in trouble largely due to the 
intense publicity surrounding them. The aim of the 
Norwegians was to build confidence and respect amongst the 
parties in private, and for the secret talks in Oslo to produce 
some solutions that could be implemented through the public 
channel. 
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The Norwegians recognised . from the start that the number one 
requirement for the kind of discussions they were trying to set 
up was secrecy. Shielding the participants from the media was 
the only way that any behind-the-scenes meetings could bear 
fruit instead of being blown apart by the press and extremist 
groups. An important precondition for Norway establishing 
the Channel was the willingness of the parties to approach the 
talks in good faith. 
Another essential difference from the American approach that 
Norway wanted to pursue was that their third party 
involvement would be facilitative rather than mediative. They 
wanted to bring the parties together to promote trust, and to 
interpret and clarify positions, and to explain difficulties each 
side faced to the other side. They would not be involved in the 
substance or merits of the talks even if they evolved into 
negotiations, but would help to smooth the way (i.e. Larsen 
became the intermediary for phone calls between the parties 
who were unable to communicate directly outside the Oslo 
forum). Norway wished to be impartial, and had already 
established the background for this with their even-
handedness in diplomatic relations with each party in the past. 
Norway's role mainly consisted of getting the parties together 
and providing the setting for direct communication between 
the parties, since at that stage Israel and America were 
refusing to acknowledge the PLO or deal with them directly in 
Washington, and it was illegal for Israelis to communicate with 
any PLO members. 
Another factor that was important in the development of the 
Norway Channel was the intensity of the talks in marked 
contrast to the many breaks and internal discussions in 
Washington. The process was little more than brainstorming 
at the beginning, yet opposite sides were living, eating and 
working together, and this proved a strong relationship base 
for progression towards agreement. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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From the first meeting, goals were set and guidelines created 
by the two parties. The PLO representatives led by Abu Ala 
were taking the opportunity very seriously because they had 
not been able to participate directly in any discussions at an 
official level. They outlined their intentions that the talks 
must avoid any historical approach to the problems and move 
forward. Ala stated that they were here to find solutions not 
to compete, and that the parties should go to the substance, to 
points can and can't agree on, and that the talks were not just 
an academic meeting of the minds, but should have an aim. 
The Israeli representatives, led by Yair Hirschfeld were 
academics, and stressed that the meeting could in no way be 
seen as an exercise in negotiations, but welcomed the talks as a 
chance to identify the common ground and sensitive issues 
that were the " mobiles" and " immobiles" of negotiations.25 
Hirschfeld' s intention was that the group could determine 
which issues could be resolved and identify those where 
flexibility was possible. 
The group resolved to work towards a Declaration of 
Principles , which would be an interim accord to build trust, co-
operation and mutual interests in order to help both sides 
agree on the final status of the Occupied Territories. Step by 
step progress was the only answer, and out of the limelight the 
parties could be more flexible in creating solutions rather than 
taking positions and defending them staunchly in the public 
arena before the eyes of the world. 
The draft Declaration of Principles created by the Channel was 
communicated to the top forums of government in each state. 
The progress and sharing of ideas in Norway was seen by the 
two governments as a possibility for agreement, and 
eventually the results of the communication between the 
parties in Norway led to a mutual recognition agreement 
between lsrael and the PLO, and to a Declaration of Principles 
for establishing interim self-government by the PLO of Gaza 
and Jericho. 
25 Jane Corbin Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel to Peace between 
Israel and the PLO (Bloomsbury, London , 1994) p. 46. 
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3. Unofficial Third Party Intervention 
A lot of other unofficial third party intervention was, and had 
been, going on at this time, resulting in a change of attitudes 
and political atmosphere. The workshops run by Herbert 
Kelman and others discussed previously using an academic 
setting to bring influential Israelis and Palestinians together 
were very similar to the process run in Norway. These 
workshops were being conducted in order to provide a setting 
and create an atmosphere conducive to interaction and 
creative problem solving between the parties themselves. 
Kelman points out that these unofficial contacts and 
interactions between the parties helped to lay groundwork for 
the developments that occurred in the Norway ChanneI.2 6 
However, Hirschfeld holds that these workshops are only of 
any use if they are connected to some official process or 
dialogue - otherwise they remain merely academic. This could 
be an elitist view, however, because Hirschfeld's group 
managed to create an official peace agreement. Kelman's 
workshops are not rendered academic simply because they are 
not linked to any official process. It delineates the workshops 
as informal but they offer assistance to the peace process 
through changing perceptions and relationship building 
because they allow for the existence of possibilities - of 
peaceful, non violent co-operative experiences with the 
"enemy". 
The evolving social climate certainly created an atmosphere 
ripe for agreement, and changing political conditions also 
played a large part in steering the parties towards an accord. 
B The Norway Channel And Facilitated Problem Solving 
The current conceptual thinking suggests that a needs based 
facilitated problem solving approach to international conflict 
26 Above n 24. 
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resolution 1s what will be successful rn norm changing and 
providing sustainable resolutions to international conflicts. 
The Norway Channel did provide this type of resolution to 
some degree, although it is difficult to tell whether the 
approach was based on the current theory, or others relating 
to behavioural psychology and social sciences, which were 
Larsen' s particular fields. Whatever the intention of Larsen, 
he provided nearly all the factors that the theorists and 
practitioners in the field propose for a problem-solving 
approach to a conflict, and the conflict was successfully 
resolved in this situation. 
The marn link to resolution seemed to be that the parties could 
communicate in a reasonable manner, that they were willing to 
listen to each other, and to delve behind the "monster" image 
that they each had of the other. It seemed that the breaking 
down of the barriers, and seeing that the "enemy" were real 
people too, resulted in a personal commitment that was a marn 
factor in keeping the negotiations going when things got 
difficult. 
The resolution was assisted by the approach of the parties who 
determined to get to the issues that needed to be resolved to 
meet both parties needs in the first place, rather than blaming 
and bickering and posturing over who had the moral high-
ground. The negotiators came into the situation with the goal 
of seeking resolutions or at least possibilities for the future, 
and this goal transformed the parties from an antagonistic 
relationship to one of co-operation and creativity. 
The approach taken in the successful Norway Channel was 
facilitation rather than mediation , and the parties established , 
intentionally or not, a problem-solving approach to the 
negotiations with the ground rules that they laid out about 
looking at the issues and not delving into the past. The 
participants attempted to accommodate the human needs of 
each group, and worked together in doing so. They also 
managed to transform the relationship in the sense proposed 
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by Lederach when they established the Declaration of 
Principles which created a forum for further resolution of 
disputes that might arise. They turned the conflict from a 
destructive process (of not recognising each other and not 
communicating) to a constructive process of co-operation and 
active participation in creating solutions for their own 
problem. 
C Post 1993 Events Under The Peace Accord - Progress 
Towards Peace ?2 7 
The peace process following the 1993 agreement has had ups 
and downs with snags at regular intervals as the parties had 
differences of opinion. The process was no longer a secret one 
as the Norway Channel had been because a foundation for 
peace talks and negotiation had been established. The talks 
had now moved to an official platform where national leaders 
and politicians from both nations were publicly discussing 
their stances and policies. 
Since 1 July 1994 Yasser Arafat has been administrator of the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho under the first 
stage of the peace agreement. The second phase of the accord 
involving a redeployment of Israeli troops from the remaining 
West Bank towns has been delayed by several years because 
of Israel's insistence on strict security arrangements after a 
series of deadly bombings by Moslem militants. Israeli 
citizens in the currently occupied West Bank towns were 
concerned that a withdrawal of Israeli troops would leave 
them exposed to guerilla attacks. The chronic delays 
implementing the accord have fuelled bitterness and unrest 
among Palestinians, who are demanding that [srael uphold the 
peace accord. 
A constant assault of terror by Arab militants caus111g the 
death of hundreds 111 an attempt to prevent progress in the 
peace negotiations has in fact been fairly successful. The 
2 7 All data detailing these events comes from articles from Reuters 
Limited via Reuters News Service. 
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Islamic militant group Barnas issued a statement that it would 
continue its "jihad" or "holy struggle" against Israel until 
"occupation is removed and dignity and rights are achieved" .2 8 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the Labour party refused to 
bow to pressure to stop negotiations under the peace process 
and vowed to step up the war against Islamic terror while 
continuing to seeking peace with the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation who had condemned the bombings and other 
terrorism. This stance of Mr Rabin was very positive for the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation and the peace proces s but 
unfortunately on 4 November 1995 he was assassinated by a 
right wing Jew . 
In early May 1996 Israel and the PLO concluded inaugural 
talks on a final peace settlement, still far apart on issues but 
united in a commitment to end decades of conflict, awaiting 
the Israeli elections on 29 May that would put the peace policy 
to the test. The vote went against the Labour party and the 
new Likud government's program which calls for letting the 
Palestinians run their own affairs while leaving all foreign 
policy and especially defence in the hands of Israel alone. 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu came to power on 
a promise to restore security while pursuing peace. He was , 
and remains, surrounded by political hardliners and retired 
army generals. The right-wing Likud government has 
envisaged a final peace settlement which would give Israel 
overall control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and are 
opposed to a Palestinian state or any form of division of 
Jerusalem , its "eternal united capital".29 Netanyahu has 
indicated his vision of limited self-rule for the Palestinians 
whereby they would "be able to choose their own institutions , 
elect their leaders, legislate their laws levy their taxes be 
independent in all the ways that are necessary for the conduct 
28 "Israel: Rabin says bus atrocity will not halt peace talks", by Eric 
Silver, Reu ters Limired., Jeru alem, 22 Augu st 1995. 
29 Norway Channel negotiator Uri Savir, now chief Israe li negotiator 
quoted in "Egypt: Israel and PLO pledge to achieve final peace" by Sarni 
Aboudi, Reute rs Limited, Taba , Egypt, 6 May 1996. 
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of their lives but certain powers would be shared and certain 
powers would be held by Israel, especially those powers that 
are necessary for the defence of our security. "3 o 
The goal of the Palestinian Authority (and the PLO) 1s to have 
an independent Palestinian state which encompasses the Gaza 
Strip, all of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The PLO has 
indicated it would demand talks be based upon UN Resolution 
242 which calls for Israeli army withdrawal from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.3 I 
Now with the fate of these difficult issues to be decided there 
is less agreement and common ground between the parties 
over what sort of outcome could be sustained is difficult to 
define. 
The Israeli government has had a policy srnce the end of the 
Six Day War of establishing Jewish settlements in occupied 
land, and since 1967 more than 130,000 Israelis have settled 
amidst nearly 2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. Netanyahu started work in March 1997 on a 6,500-unit 
Jewish settlement on a hilltop in Arab East Jerusalem which 
was occupied in 1967. Both sides claim East Jerusalem, and 
Palestinians see Jewish settlement as pre-empting the outcome 
of the final peace negotiations that have yet to take place. 
Talks are also stuck over Israel's demand for a PLO crackdown 
on "terrorism" following an attack on a Tel Aviv cafe in March 
that killed an Arab bomber and three Israelis. 
At present, Netanyahu is acting rn a inflammatory manner 
exemplified by his gift to the head of the Greek Catholic church 
in Israel, of a silver model of Jerusalem which showed a 
reconstructed Jewish temple atop Temple Mount, in place of 
JO "Israel: No quick fix to Israe l-PLO crisis - Netanyahu" by Wafa Amr, 
Reute rs Limited, Jerusalem, Israel, 11 May 1997. 
J 1 1996 "Israel: PLO sees tough bargaining at final-status talks",R eute rs 
Limit ed, Jerusalem, Israel, 3 May 1996. 
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the two mosques which actually stand there.32 Netanyahu is 
continuing with the negotiations but is taking such a hard line 
that there seems to be no room for compromise or agreement 
between the parties. It would be very difficult for any 
negotiators involved in the Oslo talks to have any influence 
over Netanyahu because those negotiators were affiliated with 
the Labour party who are now out of power. 
More recently the US mediator Dennis Ross has been actively 
involved in shuttle diplomacy attempts to get the Israelis and 
Palestinians back on track with the peace accord timetable. In 
January 1997 Ross invited King Hussein of Jordan to intervene 
after a serious breakdown in talks. Hussein managed to 
salvage an accord between the two parties over Israeli 
military withdrawal from 80% of Hebron, redeploying Israeli 
troops into the one-fifth of the city which is also home to the 
500 Jews who live amid 100,000 Palestinians. 
Palestinian President Y asser Arafat was reluctant to sign such 
a deal without simultaneous commitment from Mr Netanyahu 
to withdraw from other areas of the West Bank by September, 
as outlined in the Oslo Accords. Mr Netanyahu wanted to 
complete these further withdrawals much later, in early 1999, 
which is about the same time the two sides are supposed to be 
introducing their permanent peace treaty. King Hussein 
succeeded in persuading the parties to accept a compromise 
formulation where Israeli redeployments would be completed 
by "mid 1998", with the US giving both sides a letter 
guaranteeing this timetable. 
This US and Jordinian public involvement in the negotiations 
indicates the marked difference between the current approach 
to the peace process from the initial process which established 
the peace agreement. That situation involved mainly lower 
level representatives of the parties and was secret, rather than 
32 "Israel: Is rael due to agree today to Hebron withdrawal" Irish Times, 
Irelend , 13 January 1997, 13, by David Horovitz, Jerusalem, Israel , 
Reuters Limited . 
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having to contend with public oprn10n and intense interest 
from the international press. 
Currently difficulties have ansen because final status matters 
like the fate of Jerusalem, the nature of the permanent 
Palestinian political entity, and the fate of Palestinian refugees 
were up next for negotiation. These were the difficult 
"ideological" issues that were avoided initially in order to 
establish a platform for the parties to work together from and 
in order to enable discussions to take place without the parties 
becoming instantly at odds. 
Mr Netanyahu has said he 1s proud of his decision to authorise 
work on the settlement in East Jerusalem that has plunged the 
peace talks into deep crisis. He has said the Israelis will not 
stop the natural growth of Jewish settlements and has denied 
that the construction has halted the peace process. An Israeli 
spokesperson has said "In principle Israel did not break off the 
talks, and we will raise issues that are of concern to us such as 
fighting terror and Palestinian violations to the agreement. "3 3 
This type of grandstanding and political manipulation seems 
inescapable now that the negotiation of such intractable issues 
is impending. Israel is clearly at an advantage with the status 
quo as the land that the Palestinians want is currently under 
Israel's control. This factor has motivated Israel to use 
delaying tactics and demand concessions from the PLO, while 
claiming security as the issue. However, if Israel attempted to 
facilitate the transition rather than hinder it the security 
issues may not be so great because groups like Hamas may not 
feel such antipathy towards the Israelis or be incited to react 
with violence. 
Negotiations or any kind of meetings are at a standsti II as 
Netanyahu has said peace talks will not resume till Mr Arafat 
arrests militants following a 30 July 1997 suicide bomb attack 
on a Jewish market in Jerusalem. 
33 Above n 30. 
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The developments in the peace process raise the issue of the 
necessity of secrecy for the talks to progress. There seems to 
be links with the stalemate that occurred during the Madrid 
Process in Washington when public posturing lead to a 
breakdown in talks since parties had dug themselves into 
positions from which they could not back down. It seems 
there is a need for this political airing of issues and 
grandstanding to occur during negotiations - possibly in order 
to satisfy the public. Whatever the reasons, the phenomena 
raises the question of whether sham official talks are 
necessary in order for serious negotiations to go on in secrecy 
behind closed doors. The Norway Channel created a peace 
agreement while there was an official stalemate in 
Washington, resulting in the official talks looking like no more 
than a sham. 
According to press reports, all the participants in the Norway 
Channel secret talks have been actively involved in the peace 
process, and this involvement indicates a likelihood that these 
individuals are continuing their facilitative roles in 
negotiations between the states . The patterns emerging 
through the breakdown in talks, however, suggest that the 
participants in Norway Channel have only limited influence rn 
assisting the continuation of the peace process now that the 
negotiations have entered the political arena, particularly with 
the introduction of a new political regime in Israel. 
D Hirschfeld On The Peace Process 
Yair Hirschfeld, in a lecture at Victoria University of 
Wellington, outlined his belief that there were two main 
policies that greatly assisted in the peace process between 
Israel and Palestine: the "promise of a state" formula and the 
"principle of graduality" _34 
34 Dr. Yair Hirschfeld "The Oslo Channel", public lecture at Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand, 7 August 1997 . 
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The promise of a state formula gave the negotiat10ns a 
foundation of reality made the parties feel that there really 
was something to negotiate about. 
The "graduality" principle was important because it made a 
resolution seem possible - so that those involved could deal 
with problems more effectively one by one. One example of 
where gradual progress was important was rn dealing with the 
security risk for Israel in giving up territorial control to the 
PLO. The negotiators created a "sliding scale" for the transfer 
of control whereby control was handed over in four main 
steps, as outlined below: 
1. implementation of the agreement begins - a Palestinian 
Authority for government to be established by 4 May 1994; 
2. early empowerment - Palestine takes over tourism, social 
welfare, health , tax and education - August and November 
1994; 
3. the interim agreement - Israel to withdraw from 
Palestinian towns by 28 September 1995; 
4. the final status negotiations - to begin by 4 May 1996 and 
be concluded by 4 May 1999. 
This strategy of handing over control step-by-step resulted in 
a win-win solution for both parties because it allowed Israel to 
maintain military control over the territory to be transferred 
for as long as possible, while also giving the Palestine 
Authority an opportunity to establish social and economic 
authority which would lay the foundation for ultimate 
Palestinian control. 
Also considered important by Hirschfeld was the emphasis on 
the parties looking to common ground through joint economic 
development goals in order to make progress rather than 
allowing ideological differences to prevail in the talks . 
Hirschfeld designates the essence of the talks in Norway as the 
"Oslo spirit", maintaining that there were three important 
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principles in the code of conduct which was established that 
made it so successful.3 5 
1) Win-win thinking 
The parties determined to look at every problem with 
win-win thinking, aiming for benefits to both parties 
while allowing minimal loss. In real terms this meant 
ignoring the issue of Jerusalem because it is fraught with 
difficulty. The parties had to postpone the difficult 
issues until a positive foundation to work from had a 
been established by resolving some less difficult issues. 
2) Consultation principle 
The parties determined that each party could a·ct 
unilaterally in its political capacity, but that each party 
should consult with other side in order to prove to that 
other side that the ramifications of any actions taken had 
been considered. 
3) Non-violent dispute resolution principles 
There were three rules of conduct termed "the three 
NO's" which related to the non-violent approach to 
resolution: 
1. NO violence or terror: There would be no concessions 
to terror, and any violence would incur strong reprisals 
from the other side; 
2. NO violent non-resolution: Any attempts to disrupt 
talks and prevent resolution by violent attacks were not 
to be allowed to have any effect; 
3. NO non-violent non-resolution: Any attempts to 
interfere with the peace process by speeches or 
statements insulting the other side or taking a position 
in public which would make subsequent concessions 
difficult were not allowed . 
These principles embraced in the "Oslo spirit" were obviously 
effective during the Norway Channel, but once the talks 
3 5 Abo ve n 34. 
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became public after the agreement was made in 1993, they 
appear not to have been observed. These principles, if 
followed, would assist the process which is currently 
foundering by allowing flexibility and a period of co-operation 
between the parties, which could lead to some constructive 
solutions. The obvious problem for both parties is the militant 
Hamas terrorists who are Palestinian, yet do not follow the 
direction of the Palestinian Authority or the PLO. They are 
causing difficulty because the Palestinians have not been able 
to control the militants' violent actions towards the Israelis , 
and the Israelis blame the Palestinians for failing to prevent 
these attacks. The result is a breakdown in talks because of 
the inflexibility of the Israelis to the Palestinians over this 
issue of security, holding that the Palestinians must be 
responsible for the actions of its citizens. 
Important to the overall process 1s the breaking down of 
myths about the "other side" and the sort of people of which 
they are composed. The "eat children for breakfast" type of 
image, which is created and perpetuated by parties in conflict 
in describing the other side, helps to maintain hostility. This 
imagery also allows for a justification of any aggressive or 
violent behaviour which is encouraged against people of the 
"other side" but would not be acceptable towards people 
belonging to the "same side". 
This "de-demonisation" process 1s a continuing process, and 
involved first both nations removing laws against contact with 
citizens of the other nation. The nations arc attempting to 
address this issue through education programmes for youth 
and by assisting with joint Israeli-Palestinian projects , which 
included one major success in resolving water-sharing issues. 
The overcomrng of created prejudices is vital in the peace 
process so that the prejudices do not hinder this very real 
attempt to address a conflict which has existed between the 
two peoples for over half a century . 
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Attitude changes remain necessary to convince the public to 
accept peace rather than oppose it. The most important 
beliefs which must change relate to territorial and sovereignty 
issues. Israel must break the myth that a Palestinian state is a 
thing of the past, and that Jerusalem is a Jewish only city. The 
city has very important sacred meaning to Palestinians as well 
and can only be a "city of peace" if the Jews include the 
Palestinians. Hirschfeld indicated that there is a need to 
develop a joint image of the city to assist this inclusion, and 
that Israel has town planners working on it. 
On an individual and personal level, people were wary of the 
effects peace would have on their homes and communities, and 
clarification of the intentions and objectives of the process was 
necessary. The Palestinian belief that there was a right of 
return to homes which had been confiscated or abandoned 
during the conflict had to be broken, and Israelis living in 
settlements se t up by government during the conflict were 
assured that they would not be forced to give up their homes. 
The process remains to be finalised, and there 1s still 
uncertainty and difficulty in determining what the final 
outcome may entail. The difference that has been caused by 
the Likud government to the peace process has meant that it 1s 
behind schedule and facing constant difficulties. Hirschfeld 
has pointed out that those involved in the peace movement 
were heading a process which was leading to a Palestinian 
state and the separation of the two nations. The peace 
agreement may not produce an end to the conflict but will 
attempt to create the means for effective dialogue to maintain 
peace . 
V DEFINITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION 
There is a difficulty in defining "success" in any one mediation 
attempt, even more so when several mediation efforts are 
going on at once. There is little or no agreement over which 
point in a relationship there is a resolution of a conflict. A 
point of outcome in a dynamic and ever-changing process is 
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difficult to determine, particularly when a "resolution" may be 
considered successful by some and not by others, or successful 
at one point only to be deemed unsuccessful a few years later. 
An intervention can be successful depending on the criteria 
used to evaluate it. The zero-sum approach is a "win/lose" 
measurement where any gain by one party represents a loss to 
the other party is a traditional measure of success and is 
clearly applicable to territorial disputes. The positive sum 
approach is a "win-win" measurement where gains are made 
by both parties while minimising any losses that may occur to 
either party. 
Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston attempted to analyse the 
success and failure of international mediation by an empirical 
study which attempted to explore mediation outcomes and 
relate them to a range of contextual factors, focusing on the 
behavioural consequences of mediation rather than factors 
such as efficiency, satisfaction, or short- or long- term 
success.36 
They defined a mediation as successful when it had made a 
considerable and positive difference to the management of a 
conflict and the subsequent interaction between the parties; 
partially successful when it had initiated negotiations and a 
dialogue between the parties, and of limited success when it 
had achieved a cease-fire or reduction of violence only. These 
factors were chosen mainly because the mediations they 
studied were all official ones and their behavioural impact was 
easily assessable. 
They defined a mediation as a failure when there 1s no 
discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties' 
behaviour. Many unofficial interventions, however, would 
never be capable of this type of assessment, because any 
effects they may have would be towards changing behaviour 
36 Above n 9. 
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and attitudes of individuals - the effect of which would not be 
behind the scenes and not public knowledge. 
Another measure of the success of an intervention 1s 
relationship-based, which looks at factors such as whether 
views were shared, perceptions were altered, or conflict 
participants were directed towards a constructive solution. 
Lederach' s framework for peace discusses the possible 
consequences of conflict where it can tend towards 
constructive or destructive actions. Lederach holds that 
successful negotiations and mediation lead to a restructuring of 
the relationship and deal with fundamental substantive and 
procedural concerns. Transformation does not suggest the 
simple elimination or control of conflict, but points towards an 
understanding that conflict can move in destructive or 
constructive directions. This attempts to maximise 
constructive mutually beneficial processes and outcomes.37 
Curie's approach to mediation is a combination of psychology 
with diplomacy, because it aims to "a lter the way in which the 
protagonists view themselves, each other and the conflict".3 8 
His experience with war 1s that combatants have a distorted 
perception which makes a non-military resolution seem 
impossible. The attempt to bring about a change in 
understanding will include continual interpretations of what 
the other side is saying, explanations of their attitudes, 
exposure of false rumours , therapeutic listening, and the 
development of a personal relationship of trust and friendship 
with decision makers on both sides.39 
Dudley Weeks, an active peace-builder in international 
conflcits, insists that "resolution" is an unnatural term to be 
used in association with conflict because it implies an ending, 
whereas a successful resolution of a conflict in Week's mind is 
37 Above n 2, p. 19. 
38 Aboven21,p.27. 
39 Above n 38. 
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merely a marking point, as conflict occurs as part of an ongoing 
relationship. 4 o 
Hirschfeld holds that an intervention can only be successful if 
it is linked to an official process or has some effect in the 
political arena. In his view, any unofficial intervention, if not 
linked to actors with political influence, is too academic. 
Hirschfeld indicates that a successful intervention involves a 
great deal of attitude changing and myth-breaking in order to 
create co-operative relations and channels for dialogue. It is 
through dialogue that resolution can occur, as parties realise 
that they must co-exist, and that they are not so different from 
each other.4 1 
VI A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The implications of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process are 
that what is involved in international conflict resolution is not 
just intervention and facilitation, but an attempt to change 
perceptions and to effect a cultural shift. 
Conflict is not "bad" as discussed earlier under the nature of 
conflict as it results in creativity. The goal of conflict 
resolution is to turn the consequences of conflict away from 
violence. There is a challenge to minimise any stagnation 
which may occur when there is no conflict, and to minimise 
any violent behaviour when there is conflict. A balance must 
be found from constructively managing a conflict which 
maximises non-violent and creative behaviour rn order to 
provide conditions for ustainable peace. 
An holistic approach to conflict and its resolution involves 
incorporating the different layers of intervention operating in 
a cohesive way. The strategies employed at all levels should 
40 Dudley Weeks "Resolving Conflicts in the Glolbal Community" public 
lecture at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 21 August 
1997. 
4 1 Above n 34. 
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work together to respond to conflict on a broader, perception-
changing and relationship-altering scale. 
A A Hybrid approach to conflict resolution 
The development of a broad conceptual framework is 
necessary to embrace the full range of causes of conflict. 
Practitioners agree that no one method of conflict resolution 
will be able to achieve peace single-handedly.42 Saunders 
points out that there are some things that governments can do, 
such as negotiating to commit large groups, and some things 
that are better achieved by citizens outside government, such 
as probing the human dimensions of conflict and changing 
perceptions among groups.43 
It can be argued, but not proved, that there would not have 
been an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement in 1993 if there 
had not been a change in perceptions of Israelis and 
Palestinians outside government. This was mainly the result 
of countless dialogues among citizens of the two parties, 
through which there was a re-perception of "the enemy", and a 
willingness to try living together peacefully. 
A framework for a multi-disciplinary approach 1s needed and 
must be coherent, so that all peace efforts can be tied together 
and co-ordinated so as to be effective. Currently there is only 
an ad hoe unofficial "movement" which attempts to intervene 
in international conflicts with a preventive goal in mind. 
This framework shou Id consist of a combination of 
complementary approaches to international conflict resolution 
and included in this would be the requirement that one would 
need to know which instruments or methods of intervention 
are more successful in which areas. 
42 Nadim N. Rouhana "Unofficial Third-Party Intervention in 
Internationa l Conflict: Between Legitimacy and Disarray" ( 1995) I I 
Negotiation Journal 255. 
43 Above n 6, 274. 
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Models of conflict resolution based on a broader view of 
conflict which incorporates the human needs dimension are 
intended to provide sustainable resolution to a conflict. They 
provide a framework for resolving future problems through 
communication as well as encouraging future relations 
between the parties because their perceptions have been 
changed. Groom refers to the problem solving approach as "re-
perception of the situation, so that the conflict becomes a 
problem to solve rather than a fight to be won."44 
Other tools such as mediation and negotiation are appropriate 
when conflicts are ripe for agreement, but the tools for 
relationship building and constructive conflict management are 
ongoing processes which need to be implemented and 
continued throughout any relationship, maintaining 
communication and problem-solving constantly. 
Emond contends that the successful use of hybrid dispute 
resolution techniques suggests that creativity and imagination 
will often produce better results than a rigid adherence to a 
prescribed method of dispute resolution. 45 There is a need for 
a tiered conflict resolution process at an international level, 
incorporating many different strands of diplomacy, unofficial 
interventions, mediation and negotiations to create the "whole" 
- which will enable the conditions for true conflict resolution to 
take place. 
Clearly there 1s a need to extend and improve the practice of 
international mediation and intervention to effect this 
combined co-operative approach to conflict resolution. A 
selection of suggestions and proposals by practitioners and 
theorists in the field of international conflict resolution on how 
to implement changes towards a paradigm shift are discussed 
below. 
44 Groom, above 11 23, p. 6. 
45 Above 11 I 0. 
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B Deutsch 's Constructive Conflict Management46 
Deutsch presents a comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach 
which he calls an "utopian and ambitious program for the 
prevention of destructive conflict". 4 7 The constructive and 
destructive orientations towards conflict that Deutsch espouses 
have been discussed earlier in this paper. 
Deutsch puts forward an institutional model for change where 
different institutions (government, the media, education 
system, religion and industry) are required to become 
involved in preventing destructive conflicts. He catalogues a 
variety of actions these institutions and their leaders can take 
- particularly through leading by example - to establishing 
normative frameworks for encouraging constructive rather 
than destructive conflict resolution. They must make 
constructive conflict management procedures widely known; 
they can develop incentives to use them; they can provide 
opportunities to learn constructive conflict resolution skills; 
and they can provide facilities for dispute resolution such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration. 
Deutsch points out that on the international level the United 
Nations has a well-articulated normative framework for 
preventing war and for promoting human rights and a 
sustainable environment. 4 8 Deutsch says that only a tiny 
minority of people, even in the major powers, know about this 
United Nations framework. The United Nations needs to 
disseminate this information, to raise public consciousness, and 
to develop popular and political support for implementing it 
for it to achieve the purpose for which it was designed. 
Deutsch also suggests that a United Nations Institute for 
conflict resolution and mediation oriented internally towards 
46 Above n 8. 
47 Above n 8, 113 . 
48 Deutsch cites the work of A . Brenes-Castro Seeking the True 
Meaning of Peace (San Jose, C.A.: University for Peace Press, 1991) 
detailing this framework at Deutsch, above n 8, I I 4. 
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its own functioning as an organisation would be an excellent 
way for the UN to lead by example. It would have three main 
functions ( 1) educating administrators and staff of United 
Nations in knowledge and skills of constructive conflict 
resolution (2) mediation of conflicts which parties cannot 
resolve by themselves and (3) providing an early warning of 
potentially destructive conflicts which should be addressed. 
He also points out that the United Nations could do more than 
just serve as a model for constructive conflict resolution but 
could help to establish regional Institutes for Conflict 
Resolution and Mediation which would also perform the same 
three main roles, thus implementing a type of formal 
preventive diplomacy under the United Nations banner. 
Deutsch also discusses the need for a paradigm change on the 
international level - particularly for dealing with intractable 
conflicts. He holds that there has been too much emphasis on 
deterrence as a means of preventing destructive behaviour. 
Deterrence is often perceived as a retaliatory "threat" and 
therefore an "offensive" action by parties involved in conflict 
and so perpetuates the destructive conflict resolution pattern. 
Also the effect of deterrence is merely to "freeze" a situation 
and it will not change or redirect the motivations of the 
aggressor towards co-operation. 
Destructive management of conflict 1s prevalent throughout 
Western society - within police systems, court systems, and 
state economies. It is a competitive "win-lose" cultural 
approach to life which has caused this destructive conflict 
management and perpetuates it. 
The introduction of MMP in New Zealand was a small step 
towards changing to inclusion and co-operation but it 1s 
currently being thwarted by competitive opponents. 
Conflict resolution is all about attitude changing and culture 
changing which are fundamental changes that are very 
difficult to effect. In order to foster "win-win" relations and 
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constructive conflict management there are several values that 
Deutsch suggests must be advocated. These include the use of 
non violent non-coercive techniques of persuasion when faced 
with opposing views; the moral inclusion rather than exclusion 
of others who are different; fairness and care for others. The 
advocacy of these values would involve supporting practices 
which enhance mutual power rather than inequality; reducing 
of the availability of weapons; and indicating respect for others 
and their interests rather than seeking to devalue, disrespect, 
or humiliate them. 
In order for these constructive conflict management practices 
to become part of the fabric of social relationships, Deutsch 
suggests that supporters must advocate for the development of 
institutions in al areas of social life that would foster the 
values and practices of constructive conflict resolution. 
C A Public Peace Process - Chufrin & Saunders49 
Gennady Chufrin and Harold Saunders propose a public peace 
process which contrasts with government, even where 
government is representative. They impress the need for 
"sustained action by citizens outside government to change the 
fundamental relationship between groups in conflict." 5 O 
This "public peace process" involves bringing together 
individuals from conflicting groups and getting them involved 
in dialogue in order to probe the dynamics of their conflictual 
relationship; think together about the obstacles to changing the 
relationship; and to design a sequence of interactive steps that 
might remove the obstacles to changing it. The aim of the 
process is to transform conflictual relationships so that parties 
can both end violence and build peaceful relationships 
necessary for tackling post-conflict problems. 
4 9 Gennady l. Chufrin and Harold H. Saunders "A Public Peace Process" 
( 1993) 9 Negotiation Journal 155. 
50 Above n 49, I 56. 
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Chufrin and Saunders call the process the "political resolution 
of conflict" - where citizens outside government can strengthen 
civil society by creating relationships between and within 
political bodies over a long timeframe to deal peacefully with 
problems no one party can deal with alone. The process 
assumes that public and government can work in 
complementary ways. 
Chufrin and Saunders hold that it is in the public political 
arena (not only at the negotiating table) through dialogue over 
issues, that issues are reframed, comparable interests 
recognised, perceptions changed, fears allayed, and steps for 
changing relationships imagined. They hold that this political 
aspect of relationships in conflict should be included in any 
approach to international conflict resolution because it is here 
that issues over identity, fear, dehumanisation and historical 
hurts must be dealt with. 
In order to incorporate this political dimension into conflict 
resolution, creative ways to tap into the public as a resource 
are needed. Communication between public and government 
important as citizens often pursue interests across borders rn 
common with government and sometimes have power to 
initiate change. There is a need to link the resource of the 
public with official processes by meetings or forums in order 
to share ideas and come up with new and creative insights and 
solutions. 
Chufrin and Saunders indicate that the most pressing challenge 
to the public peace process is to find ways to make the process 
used by a wide range of groups living across the lines of 
conflict. They see no reason why new partnerships between 
official and non-official groups are not possible, holding that 
officials could form small groups from inside and outside 
government to monitor relationships with key countries. 
These groups could meet regularly with counterparts from the 
other country to share assessments and design scenarios for 
strengthening the relationship. 
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D Ury's Informal Model of International Conflict 
Resolutions I 
Currently there is no institution or group which has been set 
up to systematically improve and extend the practice of 
international mediation. International mediation mostly takes 
place on an ad hoe basis, but W. L. Ury offers several practices 
which would strengthen international mediation in order to 
make it more effective. 
Ury suggests that mediators should offer to mediate without 
being asked, and lay the groundwork for communication by 
developing trust and shared perceptions of the problem in 
order to catch conflicts before they heat up. He emphasises 
the necessity for a follow up of any intervention after the 
mediator has left, maintaining ongoing relationship building 
rather than "resolving" one-off situations. 
Ury also suggests that there needs to be a co-ordination of 
third party efforts (both official and unofficial) in order to 
build on each others strengths and weaknesses. He also 
suggests that existing efforts need to be connected with funds, 
staff, and experts. 
He holds that international conflict resolution should remain 
informal as official or institutionalised conflict resolution 
processes are ineffective. Ury considers that experience has 
shown that formal mechanisms are not often used once they 
have been established. Dudley Weeks also says that it is 
better not to have official processes because of the possible 
implications of political motivation for intervention. An official 
intervention of this kind is likely to be seen by conflicting 
states as interfering, bullying, and having its own agenda, 
which would not assist conflict resolution at all. 
5 I William L. Ury "Strengthening International Mediation" ( 1987) 3 
Negotiation Journal 225. 
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VI I IMPEDIMENTS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 
A The International Legal System 
From a legal philosophical perspective the field of international 
conflict resolution is fraught with difficulties. Legal 
philosophers hold that there are many sources of law and 
similarly there are many spheres of legal systems. 
International law is a very different sphere than domestic law 
stemming purely from the basic fact that there is no single 
controlling power structure to create and enforce international 
law such as there is domestically in the form of the modern 
state. 
Law has been portrayed appropriately by some jurists as a 
combination of reason and power, a balance of ratio and 
voluntas, rational order and imposed will.52 Roger Cotterrell 
emphasises that power in modern law means the exercise of 
coercion or the ability to call on others to exercise coercion on 
one's behalf. It is precisely here that the structure of the 
international legal system falls down . 
The situation in the global community IS that there IS no higher 
power that can control the behaviour of the parties by force or 
intimidation. The United Nations exists with moral strength 
but has no mandate to interfere with the territorial integrity of 
any state or enforce its will over any state . Nor does the UN 
any ability to impose that will, except by moral assertion or 
force through individual states on an ad hoe basis without any 
true mandate or legal authority. The Israeli-PLO example IS 
proof of that because for 50 years the Israelis held the 
occupied territories against global disapproval and against 
resolutions by the UN that what they had done and continued 
to do was immoral. 
The idea of law as an overriding standard for behaviour works 
well on a domestic level but falls down in the international 
52 Roger Cotterrell "Law's Community: Legal Theory and the Image of 
Legality" ( 1992) 19:4 Journal of Law and Society 405, 407 . 
47 
sphere where equality and community are the ideals, and no 
one group has power over the others. The UN attempts to set a 
standard for global co-operation but entrenched in the modern 
world and perhaps humanity overall is the belief that law 
equals imposed will, and this philosophy is reflected in the 
Charter, and within the structure, of the United Nations. 
The result of this lack of an overriding power in the 
international sphere means that in order for some conflicts to 
be resolved there has had to be a resort to mediation and 
negotiation rather than an appeal to some impartial law 
applying body when there has been conflict.53 This has meant 
that peace has been substituted for justice.54 The importance 
of an adjudicatory body within a legal system is to "explicate 
and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts ... 
and to bring reality into accord with them. "55 When parties 
are involved in settlement via mediation and negotiation there 
is no impartial standard of justice enforced over the outcome 
of the settlement. This consequence of settlement in the 
international sphere raises the question of whether there is 
room for abstract notions such as justice or fairness in the 
resolution of international conflicts under the current system. 
The balance of ratio and voluntas which make up our 
perception of the law must be altered in the international 
arena as states attempt to live together on a consensus basis -
where the consent of all to any rules for behaviour is required 
and where there is no ability or mandate of any entity to 
exercise coercion over another entity to enforce the law. A 
possibility exists for reading ratio and consensus rather than 
ratio and voluntas as the basis for our perception of law at 
an international level , where there is a balance of rational 
order and consensual observance which makes up the law. 
53 This is because the International Court of Justice has no binding 
authority on any state unless that state choses to be bound by its ruling, 
and also becuase of the same problem the UN General Assembly and 
Security Council face of a lack of any powers of enforcement. 
54 Owen Fiss "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1073, 1085. 
55 Above n 54, 1085. 
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B The Need for a Paradigm Shift 
The idea of consensus based law is certainly not without its 
difficulties. There are problems regarding the making of the 
rules, especially where cultural practices and beliefs are 
different and incompatible, and also as consensus would 
involve bringing together parties with major disparities in 
power, particularly in relation to economic strength and 
population size. Difficulties would also arise when the 
behaviour required under the law was not followed in the 
consensus system. There would be problems attempting to 
bring entities into line and right wrongs, but these difficulties 
exist already under the current system. 
There is a tension between a state based perspective and a 
human orientation to conflict and conflict management. The 
Utopian dream of co-operation and consensus on a global level 
is difficult to envisage and would also be incredibly difficult to 
attempt to put into place because the Western world has built 
up around economics and the orientation towards 
individualism and competitiveness. 
A transition 1s necessary to facilitate this paradigm shift. It 
involves moving away from an emphasis on individual gain, 
antagonism, competitiveness and degrees of power towards an 
emphasis on relationships and the importance of mutual gain, 
co-operation and interdependence, which results in benefit for 
individuals and for the global community. 
The localised level of international conflict resolution may be a 
good precedent for the world to follow in order to foster 
communication and therefore co-operation, but it is evident 
that more work needs to be done to assist in this process of 
shifting perceptions to effect a global cultural shift towards co-
operation and constructive conflict resolution processes. 
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VI I I CONCLUSION 
Due to the changing face of global conflict, from international 
(state-to-state) to intra-national (within states) conflict, a 
reorientation of international conflict resolution aims is 
necessary. This reorientation involves shifting the focus of 
conflict away from individual events or issues such as military 
deployment or border issues towards the fundamentals of the 
relationship between the parties in conflict. 
Theorists suggest addressing the human dimensions of conflict 
and thereby tackling the larger task of changing conflictual 
relationships by improving methods of communication; 
changing attitudes; implementing consultation between parties; 
emphasising the need to recognise the goals and requirements 
each party has. 
This sort of communication goes beyond each party defining 
what the other party's needs are but actually extends to the 
parties actively listening to each other explain needs and then 
taking them into account in decision-making. 
The ultimate goal of any intervention is communication, as it 1s 
through dialogue that any form of sustainable and non-violent 
resolution can occur. Where there is no dialogue, parties in 
conflict become suspicious of each other and this suspicion 
leads to hostility and away from communication in a "vicious" 
cycle. Where there is no dialogue there can be no 
understanding or acceptance of others, so no process of conflict 
resolution is attainable. 
The goal of interventions 111 conflict 1s to transform 
relationships by communication and make parties realise that 
to Ii ve in peace they must recognise that they are 
interdependent and need to co-operate in order to co-exist 
peacefully and without violence. 
Conflict 1s a dynamic process because it involves interaction 
between people and so is subject to constant change. Conflict 
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comes from relationship and is not a static circumstance. 
Conflict is created from human attempts to construct social 
meaning and the differences that arise because of human 
diversity. 
In the international arena, the human needs model has been 
put forward as a basis for discerning underlying reasons for 
conflict. Interpreting conflict in this way can result in a 
different method of approaching conflict and thereby altering 
the way resolution can be achieved. 
A problem solving approach to conflict resolution through the 
human needs model looks at the causal circumstances of the 
conflict and addresses these, rather than merely concentrating 
on the effects of conflict, which may vary from hunger and 
disease to religious or ethnic intolerance. The basis for this 
theory is that human needs must be satisfied for law and 
order to be sustained and for societies to be stable and non 
violent. 
A framework for peace which has a long-term view of conflict 
is necessary to construct a broader understanding of any 
approach to building peace. Such a framework must embrace 
multiple facets of conflict resolution with a clear vision of the 
broad agenda of peacemaking efforts. 
The Israeli-Palestinian case study has shown that factors 
which result in successful resolution include full 
communication; an intensity to talks; secrecy; non-positional 
negotiation; and ignoring past grievances. 
The method of informal conflict facilitation by unofficial third 
parties results in a successful intervention. Secret, back-
channel discussions among highly influential people with open 
minds who have a strong desire to achieve peace was very 
effective in establishing agreement between the parties. The 
continued involvement of these participants in the ongoing 
communication between the parties would also seem to be 
desirable to the smooth implementation of that process. Also 
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effective in constructive conflict resolution and problem-
solving are the methods of using "win-win" thinking, and 
implementing resolution rn a gradual step-by-step process. 
The case study has also shown that intense publicity and the 
resulting position-taking in front of the media result in the 
breakdown of negotiations. Non-consultation and 
inflammatory political actions are purely delaying tactics 
which hinder conflict resolution and are destructive of positive 
progress that has been made between the parties. 
A framework for a multi-disciplinary approach is needed to tie 
all peace efforts together and co-ordinate them so as to 
increase their effectiveness. This framework should consist of 
a combination of complementary approaches to international 
conflict resolution and included in this would be the 
requirement that one would need to know which instruments 
or methods of intervention are more successful in which areas. 
On a global level several options to improve the methods of 
international conflict resolution so that it is more effective and 
less piecemeal have been put forward by practitioners and 
theorists in the area. These options have several things in 
common, including a general approach, outlined by Ury, which 
extends beyond the traditional crisis management of conflict to 
a focus on changing and building relationships between 
peoples. 
Chufrin and Saunders hold that this work is for the political 
arena - not just for government offices and the negotiating 
table, and that vehicles such as the public peace process must 
be added to the array of tools for dealing with conflict and 
bui !ding relationships. 
Deutsch's model is an institutional one which advocates a 
cultural shift from destructive conflict management to 
constructive conflict management. The idea of an institutional 
model may have merit since our society has so many 
institutions, however, it has been pointed out by Ury that 
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institutionalisation often fails to perpetuate new models, and 
that these changes are more effectively spread outside 
formalisation. 
In the international sphere, a change in perception would be 
required to make the tran sition from the orientation of 
individualisation to co-operation . There is a tension between 
these orientations which is reflected in the tension between a 
state based perspective and a human orientation to conflict 
and conflict management, and in the tension between identity 
and interdependence under globalisation. 
Cotterrell points out that in modern legal systems power is 
concentrated through structures of government , but is also 
delegated to subordinate agencies and individuals. It rests in 
some indeterminate measure on the consent or acquiescence of 
the governed, so it is al so a matter of negotiation and 
compromise.56 
A transition needs to be made towards a human based view of 
conflict forgetting about states and power structures and 
international legal system s and focusing on co-operation 
between individuals. 
A culture shift to co-operation and constructive conflict 
resolution at a localised "grass-roots" level may filter through 
to the international legal system and effect a change in the 
state dimension of conflict resolution once "the governed" alter 
their perceptions and orientations to conflict. 
56 Above n 52, 408 . 
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